Asian Migration to the US: Development Implications for Asia

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Summary

This paper reviews the consequences of Asian migration to the US for the development of the migrants' countries of origin. There are three distinct types of Asian migrants: students and professionals with temporary and immigrant visas in North America, Europe, and Oceania; low-skilled migrant workers, most of whom remain in Asia; and a diverse mix of family unification, economic, refugee, and other migrants, some of whom remain in Asia and some of whom leave the region.

China, India, the Philippines and Vietnam are the most important Asian sources of migrants and immigrants for the US and Canada. Each source country has unique attributes. Migration from the Philippines, a former US colony, is well established; only a third of the Filipino-born US residents in the US in 2000 arrived in the 1990s, according to the census.[1] The number two source of Asian migrants to the US, China, began sending large number of migrants more

[1] The US had 1.4 million Filipino-born residents in 2000, including two-thirds who arrived before 1990; 45 percent of the Filipino adults in the US in 2000 were college graduates.

recently—almost half of the 1.2 million Chinese in the US arrived in the 1990s.[2] The third leading Asian source of migrants, India, also began to send migrants recently—55 percent of the one million Indians in the US in 2000 arrived in the 1990s.[3] The fourth leading Asian source of immigrants, Vietnam, is different—only 45 percent of Vietnamese arrived in the 1990s.[4]

It is very hard to determine the effects of the migration to the US of one percent of Filipinos and Vietnamese, and one-tenth of one percent of Chinese and Indians, on the development of their countries of origin:

1. The Philippines, the major migrant-sending nation in Asia, is the country most dependent remittances to sustain many families and communities. Remittances are over 10 percent of GDP, and so many young people educate themselves for overseas jobs that migration may be a substitute for development.
2. Vietnam began sending migrants to the US as a result of the Vietnam war. First-wave migrants were often well-educated and English-speaking; later waves included large numbers of refugees with little education followed by family unification migrants. Only 19 percent of Vietnamese adults in the US in 2000 had college degrees.
3. Most Chinese migrants in the US arrived after the 1989 Tiananmen incident, when Chinese in the US, including many students, were allowed to settle. The result is a bimodal distribution of Chinese migrants—many have relatively little education and live in or near Chinatowns in cities such as New York and San Francisco, while others have high levels of education and are spread throughout the US.
4. Indian immigrants most closely fit the stereotype of the successful Asian immigrant. Over half of those in the US in 2000 arrived since 1990, and 70 percent of Indian adults in the US in 2000 had college degrees.

Migration to the US may have had its most significant development impacts on the Philippines, where the migration safety valve may have reduced the need to make fundamental economic reforms. Development in Vietnam, China, and India appears to be driven more by internal policy changes than migration. The

[2] There were 1.2 million Chinese-born US residents in 2000, including 53 percent who arrived before 1990; 43 percent of the Chinese adults in the US in 2000 were college graduates.

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[4] There were a million Vietnamese US residents in 2000, including 55 percent who arrived before 1990; 19 percent of Vietnamese adults in the US in 2000 were college graduates.

exception may be the Indian IT outsourcing industry, which is closely linked to migration.

Asian Migrants to the US

Between 2000 and 2007, a third of the eight million immigrants admitted to the US were from Asia; in FY07, almost 360,000 of the 1.1 million immigrants admitted to the US were from Asia, 34 percent. Three countries, India, China, and the Philippines, accounted for half of the 2.6 million Asian immigrants between 2000 and 2007.

Table 1. Immigration to the US: 1820-2007 (mils)

	Total	Before 1970	Since 1970	Share Since 1970
World	73.1	44.8	28.3	39%
Europe	39.5	35.4	4	10%
Asia	10.9	1.6	9.3	70%
Americas	20.5	7.3	13.2	64%
Africa	1.2	0.1	1.1	94%
	FY07	FY00-07		
Asia	359,387	2,624,997		
China	70,924	455,405		
India	55,371	476,376		
Philippines	68,792	434,965		
Top 3	195,087	1,366,746		
Top 3	54%	52%		

Source: 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 2
www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm

Migrants from Asia differ from other immigrants in several ways. First, a higher share of Asian immigrants are admitted for employment rather than family unification and other reasons. About 15 percent of all US immigrants, and 24 percent of Asian immigrants, (including family members) were admitted in FY07 for employment reasons. By contrast, only seven percent of immigrants from Mexico and the Caribbean were admitted under the economic and employment priorities for issuing immigrant visas. Second, Asians dominate among some types of temporary workers—52 percent of the 462,000 H-1B admissions in FY07 were Asians.[5] Third, Asians do not loom large in US enforcement data—they accounted for less than one percent of the foreigners apprehended in FY07, led

[5] Admissions record events, not unique individuals, so a foreigner holding an H-1B visa is "admitted" each time he/she re-enters the US.

by 1,600 Chinese, and 5,500 of the 320,000 foreigners formally removed from the US in FY07, less than two percent.

The US had 37.2 million foreign-born residents in 2007, according to the American Community Survey, including 15.6 million who were naturalized US citizens.[6] The foreign-born differed from the US-born in many characteristics significant for earnings, including age, 40 for the foreign born versus 36 for the US born, education, a third of foreign-born adults did not complete high school, versus 13 percent of the US born, and language, 52 percent of the foreign-born speak English less than very well, versus two percent of the US born.

The US foreign-born population is bi-modal in attributes that affect earnings, as illustrated by comparisons between Asian-born and Latin American-born US residents in the 2000 census. The 8.2 million US residents in 2000 who were born in Asia were 26 percent of the 31.1 million foreign-born residents in the US. They had a median age of 39, 43 percent of Asian adults had a college degree or more, and 48 percent reported speaking English less than very well. By contrast, the 16 million US residents in 2000 who were born in Latin America had a median age of 34, 10 percent of adults had a college degree or more, and 62 percent reported speaking English less than very well.

The US is not the only destination for Asian migrants. Most immigrants and many temporary workers entering Canada are Asian, and Asians also migrate to Europe and Oceania. Most assertions about the impacts of migration to a particular country on the development of a migrant's country of origin are based on anecdote, especially in countries where migrants are diffused over many destinations.

Asian Migration in Perspective

The Asia-Pacific region, home to almost 60 percent of the world's people, is unusual in dealing with migration in three major respects. First, there is a widespread sense inside and outside the region that Asia is different. There are many reasons, including the Asian economic miracle that catapulted several countries from poorer to richer in a relatively short time (World Bank, 1993).[7] This economic success may encourage Asian leaders to believe that they can achieve another success in managing internal and international labor migration to achieve goals that include protecting migrants and local workers, enhancing cooperation between governments in labor-sending and –receiving areas to

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[6] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=ACS_2007_3YR_G00_S0501&-ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_G00_

[7] The East Asian economic miracle stands in sharp contrast to the lack of similar African and Latin American investment- and export-led growth success stories.

better manage migration, and ensuring that migration promotes development in labor-sending areas.

Second, there is more diversity in national labor migration policies than in national economic policies. The policy extremes can be approximated by a triangle. Singapore lies at one corner, welcoming professionals to settle with their families while rotating less-skilled foreign workers in and out of the country. Japan lies at another corner, allowing but not recruiting foreign professionals and preferring ethnic Japanese from Latin America as well as foreign trainees, students, and unauthorized workers to guest workers with full labor market rights. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries represent a third corner, relying on migrants for over 90 percent of private-sector workers, requiring migrants to have citizen-sponsors, and recently announcing policies to cooperate with migrant-sending countries to assure returns. The contrast between the similar investment-intensive and export-led economic policies of East and Southeast Asian nations, and the dis-similar labor migration policies, is striking.

Third, there appears to be convergence in the migration policies of labor-sending governments in the region. Most want to send more workers abroad, to increase the share of skilled workers among migrants, and to diversify the destinations of migrants to include more European and North American destinations. To achieve these marketing, upskilling, and diversification goals, many Asian governments have established ministries or agencies to promote and protect migrants, with promotion accomplished by ministerial visits and protection via regulation of private-sector recruiters and pre-departure reviews of the contracts they offer to migrants.[8] The evolving migrant promotion and protection infrastructure often assumes that development is a natural or inevitable outgrowth of sending more workers abroad, so that remittances can serve as the major indicator of migration's development impacts.

In 2005, Asian nations had about 48 million migrants, or a quarter of the 191-million strong migrant stock. The number of migrants in East Asia doubled between 1975 and 2005 to 6.5 million, but East Asia accounts for less than 15 percent of Asia's migrants. The number of migrants declined in south-central Asia, largely because of the shrinking number of persons resettled after wars for independence on the Indian subcontinent, and rose slower in southeast Asia than in East Asia. The most rapid growth in migrants has been in Western Asia, where the migrant stock almost doubled between 1970 and 1980, doubled again between 1980 and 1995, and increased by 40 percent in the past decade.

[8] Despite the desires of many labor-sending countries, relatively few Asian migrants move under the terms of bilateral agreements and MOUs.

Table 2. International Migrant Stock, Asia and World, 1960-2005 (Mils)

International Migrant Stock, Asia and World, 1960-2005

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Asia	**28.5**	**28.2**	**27.8**	**28.0**	**32.1**	**37.2**	**41.9**	**40.4**	**44.4**	**48.1**
Eastern Asia	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.3	3.8	4.0	4.3	5.0	5.7	6.5
Southcentral Asia	18.4	17.7	16.9	16.1	16.6	18.6	19.7	15.6	15.0	13.2
Southeast Asia	3.6	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.5	4.8	5.7
Western Asia	3.8	4.4	4.5	5.8	8.8	11.7	14.9	16.3	19.0	22.7
World	**75.5**	**78.4**	**81.3**	**86.8**	**99.3**	**111.0**	**154.9**	**165.1**	**176.7**	**190.6**
More Developed	32.3	35.4	38.4	42.5	47.5	53.6	90.4	101.7	110.9	120.6
Less Developed	43.1	43.0	43.0	44.3	51.8	57.4	64.6	63.4	65.9	70.0
Asian Share	38%	36%	34%	32%	32%	34%	27%	24%	25%	25%

Source: UN Population Division, DESA. POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2005

Migration from Asia to traditional immigration countries was largely blocked until mid-1960s, when policy reforms in Canada and the US eased entry for Asian professionals who were offered jobs by Canadian and US employers. These professionals usually arrived with their families, and most quickly climbed the economic ladder in the receiving countries. Indeed, an analysis of immigrant men in the United States in 1970 found that their earnings caught up to those of American men of the sage age and education within 13 years, and then exceeded the earnings of similar US-born men, suggesting that the extra drive and ambition that prompts migration can expand the economy and raise average earnings (Chiswick, 1978).[9]

Asian migration to traditional immigration destinations for employment and family unification has made Asian nations a major source of immigrants in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. After the Vietnam War ended in 1975, a million Southeast Asian refugees were resettled in Canada and the United States, forging new migration networks that continue to add immigrants, mostly via family unification. With affluence, there are more Asian students studying in traditional immigration destinations. Many remain to work, and some eventually settle and form or unite families.

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[9] Borjas (1994) re-examined Chiswick's findings and concluded they applied to the unique set of circumstances that accompanied the lifting of barriers to Asian immigration in the mid-1960s.

However, most international labor migration in Asia involves workers moving from one Asian nation to another for temporary employment. The first significant flows of workers in the Asia-Pacific region began after oil price hikes in 1973-74, when Gulf oil exporters turned to foreign contractors who hired foreign workers to build infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges. As the demand for labor shifted from construction to services, and from men to women, there were predictions that Arab migrants would replace Asians for language and cultural reasons (Birks and Sinclair, 1980). This did not happen. Indeed, despite efforts to "nationalize" Gulf work forces by prohibiting foreigners from filling some jobs, migrant workers, most from south and southeast Asia, continue to fill over 90 percent of private sector jobs in most Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

There is also migration from one nearby Asian country to another, as exemplified by Indonesian workers in Malaysia and Burmese in Thailand. Many of these migrants are unauthorized despite periodic efforts to legalize them. Policy in both of these countries that send workers abroad and receive migrants is in flux. The Malaysian government announced plans to reduce the employment of migrants, while the Thai government is devolving more responsibility for managing migration to provincial governments.

Migration and Development: 3 Rs

Voluntary migration between poorer and richer areas should be self stopping, as wages rise in migrant-sending areas and rise more slowly or fall in migrant-receiving areas. Eventually, there should be convergence in wages and levels of economic development, reducing the incentive to migrate for economic opportunity.

However, there is no automatic link between more migration and faster development. Migration can accelerate development in countries poised to grow, such as the southern European countries in the 1960s and 1970s, or perpetuate underdevelopment, as in many island countries today.

The effects of migration on development are often grouped in the 3-R channels of recruitment, remittances, and returns. Recruitment refers to who goes abroad, and international migration is generally most beneficial to developing countries if low-skilled workers who would have been un- or under-employed at home are recruited for jobs abroad. Remittances are that portion of the monies earned by migrants abroad that are sent home; with higher wages abroad, remittances usually exceed what migrants would have earned at home, so that migration can improve living standards for migrant families and provide additional capital to developing countries. Returns focus on what migrants do after a period of employment abroad, asking whether they acquired new skills that are useful for development or whether they return to rest and retire.

Recruitment: Virtuous and Vicious Circles

The impacts of recruitment on development can be captured by extreme examples summarized as virtuous or vicious circles (Martin, Abella, Kuptsch, 2005, Chapter 3). Sending Indian IT workers abroad is an oft-cited example of a virtuous migration and development circle, while the emigration of African doctors and nurses provides may be an example of a vicious circle. Virtuous circles are more likely if migrants are abroad for only a short time, they send home significant remittances, and they return with new skills and links to destination countries that increase trade and investment. Vicious circles can be the outcome of migrants fleeing countries perceived to be a sinking ships.

The Indian IT case began with multinationals that recognized their talented Indian employees and moved them to subsidiaries outside India. Eventually, Indian firms that specialized in moving IT workers to foreign jobs evolved, especially during the late 1990s IT-boom when there were fears of so-called Y2K problems with computers.

Indians abroad learned what clients there expected, and this experience allowed some Indians to return to India to perform work for foreign clients, creating jobs in India (Kapur, 2007). Between 1985 and 2005, the number of IT workers in India ballooned from 7,000 to over 700,000, Indian IT workers gained a global reputation for high-quality and low-cost work, and the quality of IT services in India improved, since there was no reason not to provide the same quality of services to local as foreign clients, accelerating India's development. The Indian government bolstered the IT industry by reducing barriers to imports of computers, helped to assure a reliable communications infrastructure, and allowed the state-supported Indian Institutes of Technologies to set quality benchmarks for IT education. This virtuous circle created new jobs in India as well as a new source of export earnings. [10]

The Indian government supported and encouraged this migration. The governments of many African countries, by contrast, complain that the recruitment of health care professionals by public and private health services in their former colonial rulers has led to a vicious circle in which a lack of health care slows economic development.

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[10] Khadria (1999) questions the extent of the virtuous circle from Indians settled abroad, finding that Non-resident Indian investments in India benefit primarily the investors rather than India as a whole because the NRI investors do little to directly improve the Indian education and health care systems.

In the late 1990s, the British National Health Service (NHS) hired more doctors and nurses to reduce patient waiting times, including some from former African colonies, prompting several African governments to complain that the UK was recruiting doctors and nurses who had been trained at taxpayer expense, lowering the quality of health care in developing countries strained by AIDS. Some African countries demanded compensation for the recruitment of their health care professionals, and some withheld the final licenses usually needed to find jobs abroad until doctors and nurses trained at government expense completed a period of service, often in a rural area.[11]

These complaints of a health-care brain drain led to ethical recruitment initiatives. For example, the UK Code of Conduct for Recruitment of Health Professionals, developed in 2001 and applicable only to the National Health Service, asserts that “international recruitment is a sound and legitimate” method of hiring, but advises the NHS not to “target developing countries for recruitment of health care personnel unless the government of that country formally agrees.” (Buchan, 2002, 19).[12] The World Health Organization expects to issue a code of best practices for the international recruitment of health care workers in 2009 (www.who.int/hrh/public_hearing/en/index.html)

The health-professional worker migration issue is complex. First, government-set salaries for doctors and nurses have not increased significantly despite the exodus. Second, there are human rights concerns about restricting the right of health care workers to leave a country. Physicians for Human Rights, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its work to ban land mines, issued a report in July 2004 that called on industrial nations to reimburse African countries for the loss of health professionals educated at government expense. However, PHR also emphasized that there is a trade off between the rights of African health professionals to seek a better life abroad and the rights of people in their home countries to decent health care.[13]

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[11] For example, South Africa graduates about 1,300 doctors and 2,500 nurses a year; those who receive government support for their education must serve two years in rural areas before receiving their license to practice. South Africa complained that it spent $1 billion educating health workers who emigrated in the 1990s, equivalent of a third of the development aid it received from the end of apartheid in 1994 to 2000.

[12] The International Council of Nurses issued similar recruitment guidelines in 2001 (/www.icn.ch/psrecruit01.htm)

[13] Celia W. Dugger, "In Africa, an Exodus of Nurses," New York Times, July 12, 2004. PHR did not recommend that African governments try to prevent the emigration of health care workers, but did recommend that industrial countries not recruit actively in Africa.

Clemens agrees that the interactions of health care deficiencies and migration are complex, but concludes that solutions to health care workforce issues in many African countries lie inside the country. For example, many developing countries do not sufficiently compensate doctors and nurses assigned to rural areas, and some prohibit the establishment of private health-care training institutions.

The vicious circle in which outmigration leads to slower development is an example of brain drain concerns that have been recognized for decades (Adams, 1968). However, there has been no agreement on a global response. Bhagwati (1976) would have migrant-receiving countries compensate migrant-sending countries for the cost of the education embodied in the migrants from developing countries employed inside their borders, but this proposal has suffered from practical implementation problems, including deciding how to collect extra or normal taxes paid by migrants in industrial countries and how to distribute such compensation in their countries of origin.

Compensation has in recent years been downplayed, in part because of the brain-gain via brain-drain theory. The governments of countries that send educated workers abroad "lose" the investment made in their education and may suffer slower growth as a result, the classic brain drain. However, the brain-gain via brain-drain theory holds that, because some developing country professionals go abroad and enjoy higher earnings, the average earnings of all professionals in a developing country rise and encourage more young people to go to school (Mountford, 1997, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001). However, not all of those who acquire healthcare or other professional qualifications will emigrate for personal and other reasons, so the sending country winds up with more nurses than if it prohibited the recruitment of "essential workers." A moment's reflection suggests that the brain-gain via brain-drain theory is not widely applicable in the contemporary world, with the possible exception of Cuba and North Korea.

The complexity of the brain-drain debate is heightened by the contrast between the mostly African countries demanding compensation for the recruitment of their health care workers and countries such as the Philippines, which has government agencies to promote the out-migration of professionals, including nurses. Most Filipino health care workers who emigrate are trained in private, tuition-charging schools, and most nursing students take out loans to cover the cost of their education. The Filipino experience suggests that changes in policies unrelated to migration, such as how education is financed, may be more important than trying to manage the brain drain via migration and compensation policies.

The recruitment experiences of most migrant-sending countries are between the virtuous and vicious migration and development extremes. Indeed, governments in migrant-sending often have little control over who is selected to fill foreign jobs, since employers abroad normally determine who to hire. Employers want the best worker they can recruit to fill vacant jobs, even if that means an engineer from a low-wage country winds up filling a low-skill job abroad, resulting in "brain waste."

Remittances: Shortcut for Development?

Most migrants remit some of their foreign earnings to family and friends at home. During the 1990s, when remittances to developing countries doubled, sending-country governments and development institutions became aware of rising remittances, which often provided the foreign exchange essential to cover balance of payments deficits and sustain economic development policies (Ratha, 2003). Leaders of major labor-sending countries began to acknowledge the importance of remittances by symbolically welcoming home some returning migrants at Christmas each year, as in the Philippines, or calling migrants "foreign exchange heroes," as with former Mexican President Vicente Fox.

Remittances pose several migration and development challenges. Many national governments as well as international organizations such as the World Bank want to increase remittances, which can be accomplished by sending more workers over national borders and ensuring that they earn, save, and remit. Governments and international organizations want to reduce the costs of sending money via formal channels, which should reduce the use of informal channels for remittances and minimize the opportunity for terrorists to use such channels.

The World Bank reported that remittances totaled $337 billion in 2007, up 13 percent from $297 billion in 2006 (www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances). The top five recipients of remittances are India, which received $27 billion in 2007; China, $26 billion; Mexico, $25 billion; the Philippines, $17 billion; and France, $12 billion. The major sources of remittances were countries with the most migrants, the US, $42 billion, and Saudi Arabia, $16 billion. In 2007, 59 countries received more than $1 billion in remittances, and in 45 countries remittances were more than 10 percent of GDP.[14]

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[14] Escobar (2008, Table 2) compares remittances per capita and GDP per capita in 2003 for selected Lain American countries, finding that in very poor countries such as Haiti and Bolivia remittances per capita from Haitians and Bolivians in the US were over four times larger than GDP per capita, e.g. $2,000 per US Haitian in remittances versus $500 in GDP per capita. However, in richer countries such as Mexico, remittances per capita were less than GDP per capita.

Most migrants are from developing countries, and 75 percent of global remittances went to developing countries --the $240 billion received by developing countries in 2007 was almost triple the $86 billion they received in 2000. There are several reasons for rapidly rising remittances, including better reporting after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,[15] lower costs to remit via banks (which are more likely to report remittances), and the depreciation of the dollar, which raises the dollar value of remittances transferred in other currencies (World Bank, GEP, 2006, pxiii).[16]

The major migration and development challenge tackled over the past decade has been to reduce the cost of sending small sums over borders via regulated financial institutions. There are three steps involved in a typical remittance transfer: the migrant pays the remittance to a money transfer firm such as Western Union in one country, the money transfer firm instructs its agent in another country to deliver the remittance, and the agent pays the recipient.[17]

These three steps are sometimes called the first mile, the intermediary stage, and the last mile, and they involve three major costs. First is the fee paid by the sender, typically $10 to $30 to send the usual $200 remittance. Second is the exchange rate difference, as when dollars are converted to pesos at a rate less favorable than the interbank exchange rate. Third are fees that may be charged to recipients when they collect their funds (in many cases, remittance pick-up points are located in stores or other outlets that encourage recipients to spend some of the money received). There may also be an interest rate float if there is a time lag between paying and receiving remittances.

The second remittance-related migration and development challenge is to ensure that the spending of remittances accelerates development in migrant-sending areas. Most studies suggest that each $1 in remittances generates a $2 increase in economic activity, as the spending of remittances on housing, education, and health care creates jobs (Taylor and Martin, 2001; Yang and Martinez, 2006). Most remittances are spent on daily needs, as would be expected because foreign earnings replace money that would have been earned locally. However,

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[15] The World Bank reported that some migrants in rich countries remitted more funds after September 11, 2001 so they would have funds at home if they were deported. Such “defensive remittances” may help to explain the tripling of remittances to Pakistan between 2001 and 2003 (World Bank, GEP, 2006, 92).
[16] Another factor increasing formal remittances is the spread of banks from migrant countries of origin to migrant destinations, where they offer services in the migrant’s language as well as ancillary services to migrant relatives at home.
[17] Agents in the two countries periodically settle their credit and debit accounts, often via a commercial bank.

remittances often exceed what would have been earned at home, and after basic consumption needs are satisfied, remaining remittances are often used to build or improve housing, educate and provide health care to children, and expand or launch new businesses.

Remittances can speed up development if macroeconomic fundamentals are correct. Sound economic policies give all residents, migrants and non migrants, incentives to save and invest (World Bank, GEP, 2006). One policy question is whether governments should have special policies to encourage migrants to send remittances, such as matching remittances that are contributed to develop migrant areas of origin.

Mexico's 3x1 matching program is perhaps the best known. It provides $3 in federal, state, and local funds for each $1 contributed by migrants abroad for improvements in their areas of origin.[18] However, the 3x1 program has limited impacts on development because it is small, reflects migrant priorities that may be different from those of non migrants, and reduces funds available for other projects. Mexican migrants contributed $20 million under the 3x1 program in 2004, which was 1/10 of one percent of Mexico's $20 billion in remittances. Spending the total $80 million available was sometimes problematic, since migrants often want to improve the local church for weddings and festivals, while non migrants may want water and sanitation system improvements. Matching funds come from government development budgets, so migrant contributions effectively "leverage" development funds for purposes that may run counter to priorities of non migrants.

The best way for a migrant-sending country to maximize remittances and their impacts on development is to get the economic fundamentals correct, which means having an economy that is growing, an appropriate exchange rate, and a climate that fosters small investments. Migrants can sometimes have other impacts that speed development, as when they steer investments to their countries of origin and persuade their (foreign) employers to buy products from their countries of origin. Migration increases travel and tourism between countries, as well as trade in ethnic foods and goods that migrants became familiar with while abroad.

[18] The World Bank's GEP 2006, p95 concluded that most Hometown Associations (HTAs) raise and invest less than $10,000 in their communities of origin, and that the effects of such investments are "poorly documented." In particular, GEP 2006 asserts that Mexico's 3 x 1 program, begun in 1997, established projects worth $44 million by 2002, but concludes "HTAs have not been very successful" in part because Disaporas may not have good information on local needs or have different priorities for infrastructure improvements.

Returns: Entrepreneurs or Retirees?

The third R in the migration and development equation is returns. Migrants who have been abroad can return with new energy, ideas, and entrepreneurial vigor that accelerates development in their countries of origin. Migrants are generally drawn from the ranks of the risk takers, and a combination of their remittance savings and skills acquired abroad can speed development, as in southern Europe and Korea. On the other hand, if migrants settle abroad and cut ties to their countries or origin, or if they return only to rest and retire, there may be few development-accelerating impacts of migrant returns, as in many Pacific and Caribbean islands. There is also the possibility of back-and-forth circulation, which can under some conditions contribute to economic growth in both countries.

A desirable outcome is migrant-led development, meaning that migrants accelerate development upon their return. Taiwan provides an example. Government policy encouraged out migration during the 1960s and 1970s, and return migration in the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1960s and 1970s, most government educational spending was for primary and secondary education, so Taiwanese often went abroad for university education, and over 90 percent of Taiwanese graduates remained overseas.[19] When Taiwan's economy began to grow rapidly in the late 1970s, the government established the Hinschu Science-based Industrial Park to encourage Taiwanese abroad to return by offering financial incentives and subsidized Western-style housing (Luo and Wang). Hinschu, begun in 1980, became a major success by 2000, when over 100,000 workers were employed by 300 companies, half headed by returned = migrants. Many local governments in China have followed a similar strategy of subsidizing the return of migrants to speed economic development. [20]

It is much harder to persuade migrants who have been successful overseas to return and contribute to the development of countries that are not taking off economically. There is often little need for Taiwanese-style return subsidies if a developing country grows rapidly, as is evident from Ireland to China. But if prospects for development at home are uncertain, even subsidies may be insufficient to persuade migrants settled abroad to return. Several international organizations operate return-of-talent programs, offering to cover the cost of

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[19] These students were highly motivated to pursue advanced studies. Before they could do abroad, they had to complete two years of military service and obtain private or overseas financing.

[20] Shanghai reportedly had 30,000 returned professionals in 2002, 90 percent of whom had MS or PhD degrees earned abroad. Jonathan Kaufman, "China Reforms Bring Back Executives Schooled in US," Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2003; Rone Tempest, "China Tries to woo its Tech Talent Back Home," Los Angeles Times, November 25, 2002.

travel and housing for professionals settled abroad who return to work in government or educational institutions. However, the contribution of such programs to development appears to be very modest (Keely, 1986), since human capital cannot reverse the effects of deficient development policies.

Rising interest in migration and development have prompted more governments to recognize that migrants abroad may be a key to development at home. Many migrant-sending governments have enacted legislation that permits or encourages dual nationality or dual citizenship in an effort to maintain links to citizens abroad. Some researchers believe that, in a globalizing world, dual nationality can be the keystone for "a Diaspora model [of development], which integrates past and present citizens into a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined with the home country as the center." (Bhagwati, 2003).

Migration and Development in Asia

Philippines

The Philippines sends more workers abroad each year than any other Asian country. According to the government, there are 83 million Filipinos at home and eight million abroad.[21] Filipino migrants remitted over $1 billion a month in 2007, a total $14.4 billion, equivalent to 10 percent of the country's GDP. In recognition of the importance of migrants and remittances to the economy, the Filipino president welcomes some returning migrants at Christmas in a "Pamaskong Handog sa OFWs" (welcome home overseas foreign workers) ceremony.[22]

Almost 1.1 million Filipinos went abroad legally to work in 2007, an average of 3,000 a day, the equivalent of seven 747s; a similar 1.1 million Filipino migrants were deployed in 2006 (POEA, 2008). Some 811,100 were land-based, meaning they filled jobs on land, and 266,500 were sea-based workers, manning the world's ships. Most of the land-based migrants, 61 percent, had been abroad before, in jobs ranging from domestic helper to driver to construction worker and in countries from Saudi Arabia to Canada. [23] Filipinos are 30 percent of those who man the world's ships.

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[21] PRB.org puts the Philippine population at 90 million in 2008, and a projected 150 million in 2050.

[22] An account of the December 20, 2007 welcome is at www.devbankphil.com.ph/News/news_full.php?articleid=00350

[23] Of the 811,000 land-based migrants leaving in 2007, almost 30 percent went to Saudi Arabia, 15 percent went to the UAE, and about six percent each went to Hong Kong, Qatar and Singapore— these five countries absorbed two-thirds of the land-based Filipinos deployed in 2007.

Table 3. Philippines: Migrant Deployments in 2006-07

	2007	2006
Total	1,077,623	1,062,567
Landbased	811,070	788,070
Rehires	533,098	489,528
Share	66%	62%
Seabased	266,553	274,497
Destinations		
Saudi Arabia	238,419	223,459
UAE	120,657	99,212
Hong Kong	59,169	96,929
Qatar	56,277	45,795
Singapore	49,431	28,369

Source: POEA. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. 2008. Overseas Employment Statistics 2007. www.poea.gov.ph

President Marcos in 1974 issued Decree 442 to ensure "the careful selection of Filipino workers for the overseas labor market to protect the good name of the Philippines abroad." Decree 1412 in 1978 discussed strengthening worker recruitment for local and foreign jobs "to serve national development objectives." The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was created in 1982 to promote the migration of workers and to protect them during recruitment at home and employment abroad.

Over half of the migrants leaving the Philippines are women, and some are vulnerable to abuse in the private households in which they work. In 1995, Flor Contemplacion, a Filipina domestic helper in Singapore, was hanged after killing another Filipina maid and a Singaporean child.[24] Philippine President Fidel Ramos was unable to win additional time to investigate the case, prompting the enactment of Republic Act 8042, the so-called Filipino migrant workers' Magna Carta, which obliges the government to take steps to protect migrants abroad.

The POEA sends workers abroad, regulates private recruitment agencies, and checks the contracts that recruiters provide to migrants (www.poea.gov.ph) with a 243 million peso ($5.5 million) budget in 2007 and 508 employees—its costs were 218 pesos ($5) for each migrant deployed. The POEA directly sent 8,600 workers abroad in 2007, about one percent of the land-based migrants, including 5,200 Filipinos to Korea; only the POEA can send workers to Korea.

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[24]The events surrounding this case are covered in Asia Week. 1995. A Death in the Family. December 29. www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/95/1229/feat3.html

Israeli-Lebanon fighting in summer 2006 resulted in the return of Filipina domestic helpers who complained of mistreatment.[25] The government responded with the "Supermaid" program that, beginning in January 2007, requires Filipina domestic helpers abroad to receive training in emergency health care before departure and to be paid at least $400 a month. The number of Filipinas deployed as domestic helpers fell sharply--there were 91,000 newly hired household service workers in 2006 and 40,000 in 2007. POEA suspects that some may leave as gardeners or other types of workers not covered by the $400 a month minimum wage, which may prompt a minimum wage for all those going abroad, so that domestic helpers do not leave as gardeners or security guards.

The Philippine government believes it is managing labor migration effectively, citing more workers leaving legally and fewer licensed recruitment agencies (agencies that violate rules are closed). There were 1,363 licensed recruiters in 2007, including 1,010 land-based recruiters and 353 manning firms that provide seamen to shipping companies. The POEA, which has a hard-to-enter, easy-to-go policy toward recruiters, requires them to post bonds of two million pesos ($45,000) and to be jointly liable with foreign employers if the contracts of migrant workers are violated.

Joint liability is a potential best practice that may be useful to protect migrants in other countries. First-time migrants may not know much about the foreign jobs they are leaving to fill, and Philippine law makes Filipino recruiters jointly liable with foreign employers to fulfill the terms of the contracts signed by the foreign employer, the Filipino recruiter, and the migrant. Migrants abroad often have limited access to redress for contract violations, but when they return to the Philippines, migrants can turn to POEA for assistance if there were violations of contract terms, and Filipino recruiters must pay judgments against the foreign employer.

The Philippines deployed 50,000 workers to foreign jobs in 1975. The number rose to 500,000 a year in the late 1980s, and today tops the one million a year target set by the government for the 2004-2010 period. The major debate among Filipino economists is whether labor out-migration will be self stopping, as migrants send home remittances that are spent and invested to fuel economic and job growth, or whether some migration will create conditions that lead to more migration.

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[25] Fighting between Israeli and Hezbollah in mid-2006 resulted in 6,000 Filipinos, mostly domestic helpers, being flown home; two-thirds were undocumented. Between 1990 and 2005, migration to Lebanon was banned because of frequent mistreatment of domestic helpers. That ban was lifted in 2005, and reimposed in 2006.

Remittances reduce poverty. Adams and Page (2005) find that a 10 percent increase in the share of migrants in a country's population is associated with a 1.9 percent decrease in the share of residents living in poverty, defined as living on less than $1 a day, and that a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances in a country's GDP is associated with 1.6 percent reduction in poverty. However, with most remittances accruing to wealthier households, migration does not significantly reduce inequality in the Philippines (Rodriguez, 1998).

Indeed, instead of being better off because of remittances, poor non-migrants may be worse off because of Dutch disease, as remittances increase the value of the peso and shrink the number of jobs in garment and other export-oriented manufacturing industries. Acosta et al (2007) find this result for El Salvador, that is, remittances reduced the supply of labor and increased the demand for nontradeable goods, which increased the value of the currency and reduced jobs in the export-sector. The Philippines central bank in 2007 pointed to evidence of Dutch disease, including the appreciation of the peso, the loss of jobs in export industries, and a rising price of nontradeable to tradable goods, including housing.[26]

The social effects of remittances are also uneven. The so-called complacency effect may reduce the work efforts of members of families with a migrant abroad. Pernia concluded that migration and remittances have very mixed effects on the Philippines, as the "remittance windfall may have a moral hazard effect as the government softens in pursuing policy reform or improving governance while people are lulled into complacency, as appears to be happening in the Philippines." (2008, 8) Furthermore, he concluded that "labor export cannot be relied upon as a policy for reducing poverty, redressing income inequality and, for that matter, fostering the country's long-run development." (2008, 21)

A culture of migration reportedly prompts many children to plan to follow their parents abroad to work, and may lessen their interest in education and the local labor market. Labor migration has been called a "civil religion," with teens considering where to go abroad, TV shows exploring the tensions associated with family separation, and the Central Bank displaying remittance numbers on a billboard at Christmas. Evangelist Rick Warren calls Filipino guest workers the Josephs of today, toiling in the homes of modern Pharaohs to liberate Filipinos at home.[27]

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[26] Ernesto B. Calucag, "The symptoms of Dutch disease," Business World, February 22, 2008. www.bworldonline.com/Research/populareconomics.php?id=0074

[27] Jason DeParle, "A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves," New York Times, April 22, 2007

India

India sends primarily low- and semi-skilled workers to the Gulf oil-exporting states. According to the 2000 Census, there were a million US residents born in India. Their median age was 35, almost 70 percent were college graduates, and a quarter reported speaking English less than very well.

As in the Philippines, it may be that the relatively small number of Indian migrants in the US has more development impacts in India than the much larger number of Indians in the Gulf states. Migration from India to the Gulf is primarily from southern India; Kerala and Tamil Nedu each contribute 20 percent of India's migrants. However, the development impacts of this migration to the Gulf are mixed. For example, some 1.8 million Kerala residents are abroad, and remittances of $5 billion a year are equivalent to 20 percent of Kerala state's GDP.[28] About a quarter of remittances to Kerala are spent on education, and educating residents who cannot find jobs locally reportedly spurs emigration, as unemployment in Kerala is almost 20 percent. Kerala is a state of 32 million with a per capita income of $675, below the $730 average for India.

A survey of Indian migrants found that 80 percent learned of foreign jobs from friends and relatives, they paid an average $1,200 to migrate, and a third turned to money lenders to cover these pre-departure costs. Migrants using recruitment agents paid more, an average $2,000, to cover the cost of the foreign work visa, passport, medical tests, insurance and the airfare to the job. About 60 percent of the jobs held by the Indians in the Gulf paid $200 a month, making recruitment costs equivalent to six to 10 months' earnings.

China

There were 1.2 million US residents born in China, according to the 2000 census (excluding Taiwan. Their median age was 41, 43 percent were college graduates, and 64 percent reported speaking English less than very well.

At least 10 percent of Chinese are internal migrants, some 130 million, meaning they are living and often working away from the place in which they are registered. Most migrants have moved from rural areas in the center and western parts of China to cities and coastal provinces in the east.

The Chinese government introduced the hukou household registration system in the 1950s first to allocate grain and later to regulate internal migration (Chan,

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[28] A driver from Kerala employed in Qatar reported earning $375 a month, five times the $75 a month he earned in Kerala, but lamented that he sees his family only during one three-week vacation a year. Jason DeParle, "Jobs Abroad Support 'Model' State in India," New York Times, September 7, 2007

1999). As a result, Chinese are generally registered in their place of birth, and it is often difficult to change registration from one place to another. Especially low-skilled migrants may find it difficult to access to government services that range from housing to education to health care away from the place where they are registered-- access to public services is generally confined to the place in which the hukou says the individual is registered.

In 1978, before market reforms began, about 70 percent of Chinese were employed in agriculture, which generated 28 percent of GDP. By 2006, only 43 percent of the 760 million Chinese workers were employed in agriculture, which generated 12 percent of GDP. Most estimates find that up to half of the 327 million agricultural workers in China are redundant. However, many "surplus rural workers" are over 40, and less attractive to urban employers. In 2006, urban residents in China had an average income of 10,500 yuan ($1,400), compared with 3,300 yuan ($440) in rural areas.

About 350 million Chinese, a quarter, had urban hukous in 2008, while 950 million had rural hukous. However, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction reported that 45 percent of Chinese, about 600 million people, lived in cities in 2008, reflecting significant rural-urban migration. Not all of those who are living in urban places while registered in rural places are workers—estimates of the number of persons registered in rural areas and working in urban areas in 2008 range from 150 million to 200 million. The number of rural-urban migrant workers has been rising—it was about 30 million in 1982, 54 million in 1995, and 140 million in 2004.

Most of the 110 million workers employed in Chinese manufacturing are internal rural-urban migrants, as are most of China's construction workers. About 70 percent of China's internal migrants are between 15 and 35 who earn lower wages than urban residents, an average 540 yuan ($80) a month in 2004, compared to 1,350 yuan for registered urban residents. Remittances from urban to rural China are estimated to exceed $80 billion a year. With more couples migrating, more children are left with relatives in rural areas. In 2008, an estimated 58 million children under 17 lived in rural areas without either parent.

The Chinese central government has been debating whether to loosen or abolish the hukou system. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January 2008 recommended that the household registration (hukou) system be ended within five years so that internal Chinese migrants have the same benefits in employment, education, healthcare and housing as local residents. The NRDC, which said a "free flow" of migrants from rural to urban areas would maintain rapid economic growth, estimated that 43 percent of China's 1.3 billion residents live in cities, including 200 million rural-urban migrants.

However, the most recent review by the Ministry of Public Security in 2005 concluded that local governments would have to extend to migrants the right to housing, education and health care, which would cost money. The central government recently ordered urban schools to accept migrant children and not charge fees for K-9 education. However, some urban schools levy other fees, prompting some migrant parents not to enroll their children in regular public schools.[29] Cui Chuanyi, a rural development researcher at the State Council, China's Cabinet, said in 2007 that "Very few migrants sever their ties to the farm, not because they don't want to move but because their human rights in the cities are not protected."

Some local governments are making it easier for rural-urban migrants. Shenzhen, which has 2.1 million registered residents and eight million migrant workers, in July 2008 became the first Chinese city to offer "citizenship" to migrants. Residents ages 16 to 60 who have been living in the area at least 30 days but are registered elsewhere, can obtain 10-year residence certificate smart cards that allow them to apply for driving licenses and business visas to visit Hong Kong or Macao. Children of residence certificate cards will be able to go to local public schools, and their families can apply to live in low-cost public housing.

Other Asian Countries

Vietnam is the fourth largest source of Asian migrants. According to the 2000 Census, there were a million US residents born in India. Their median age was 37, 19 percent were college graduates, and 70 reported speaking English less than very well.

Like Cubans, Vietnamese arrived in the US in waves. The first wave was dominated by those who worked with the US military, many of whom had education and English. Later waves included primarily refugees and family members, many of whom had little education, helping to explain the bimodal character of those born in Vietnam.

Most Vietnamese who migrate to work abroad do not come to the US. Before 1989, Vietnam had labor cooperation agreements with several East European countries, including East Germany, under which workers were sent abroad to repay debts incurred by the government. Since 1993, Vietnam has allowed and increasingly promoted labor emigration, and had 400,000 migrant workers in 40

[29]Fees for unofficial primary school in urban areas are often $25 or $50 a month. Current law requires high-school students seeking to attend college to take entrance exams in the place they are registered to live. Most children who move to urban areas with their parents reportedly drop out of school.

countries in 2006, including 100,000 in Malaysia and 90,000 in Taiwan (Anh Nguyen, 2007, 3-6).

Vietnamese migrants have some of the highest debts when they go abroad, often exceeding the earnings they expect in first year of typical three-year contracts. As a result, up to 25 percent of Vietnamese migrants run away from the employer to whom they were assigned, since they can earn more as unauthorized workers than as legal workers with debt deductions from their wages. In response, the Vietnamese government has proposed punishing runaways when they return to Vietnam.

Most Vietnamese migrants have three-year contracts, and their expected earnings as well as the cost of migrating vary significantly by destination. Migrants to Malaysia earn the least, $10,800 over three years, while migrants to South Korea earn the most, $30,600 over three years. The costs of migrating abroad are lowest for those going to South Korea, $700 or two percent of expected earnings, but Korean employers expect migrants to work up to 10 hours a day, and abuse of migrants is reported to be common. Malaysia accepts twice as many Vietnamese migrants as Korea, but at wages that are only a third of Korean levels, so that migrants in Malaysia have far lower savings and remittances.

Vietnam had a five percent tax on remittances until 1997; when this tax was removed, formal remittances rose (GEP, 2006, 93). Like many other countries that send workers abroad, Vietnam allows returning migrants to import some goods duty free when they return from jobs abroad. Vietnam in 2006 taxed those earning more than five million dong ($315) a month, but was considering lowering the income threshold to raise more taxes from lower earners, including migrants.

Bangladesh and Indonesia are examples of countries that send large numbers of workers abroad, but few to the US—there were 95,000 Bangladeshi-born US residents according to the 2000 Census, and 72,000 born in Indonesia. Both immigrant groups are young and well educated—the median age of Bangladeshi-born US residents was 33, and 46 percent were college gradates, while the median age of Indonesian-born US residents was 37, and 46 percent were college gradates.

Conclusions

Long-distance migration often has a Darwinian quality--the harder it is to migrate to another country, the more human capital of those who succeed in entering and settling. It has been harder for Asians to immigrate to the US than for Latin Americans, and most US residents born in Asia have more human capital than those born in Latin America.

The Philippines, India, and China present three very different cases of migration to the US and their consequences for development at home. There are an estimated eight million Filipinos abroad, including 1.4 million in the US in 2000, the major source of remittances to the Philippines. Philippine-born US residents were slightly older than US-born residents in 2000, a median 42 versus 36, and relatively well educated—87 percent of adults were high-school graduates and 45 percent were college graduates. Filipinos in the US are less than 20 percent of Filipinos abroad, but they account for over half of remittances to the Philippines.[30]

There were 1.2 million Chinese-born US residents in 2000, and over half arrived before 1990. Most had high levels of education--43 percent of the Chinese adults in the US in 2000 were college graduates. By contrast, 70 percent of the Indian adults in the US in 2000 were college graduates, one reason why Indians are more often associated with IT and other industries and occupations requiring high levels of education.

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[30] Some $7.6 billion of the $14.4 billion in remittances reported by the Philippine Central Bank in 2007 was recorded as coming from the US; Saudi Arabia was the second leading source of remittances, $1.1 billion in 2007. The US share of remittances may be inflated by migrants in e.g. Hong Kong using US banks to transfer remittances. (www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm).

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