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Conference on “Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring”

November 17, 2014

Faculty House, Columbia University Morningside Campus   New York, New York, United States

Agenda  396kb pdf
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Recent events--especially the difficulties faced by Argentina--have reminded us of the risks of not having orderly Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring. Its absence has led to the emergence of destabilizing speculative behavior in international debt markets and has delayed the resolution of sovereign debt crises. Delays in debt restructurings have been costly for sovereigns and for good-faith investors.

The potential adverse effects for global economic, political, and social stability that the lack of these frameworks implies make their design and implementation a matter of urgencya claim that has been recently endorsed by a resolution of the United Nations.

The International Monetary Fund recognized the need for implementing these frameworks in 2001.

Over the past fifteen years discussions have explored many alternatives, and their economic, political, and social consequences. Each has to be evaluated in terms of ex ante incentives is there, in some sense too much or too little lending? How is lending distributed across countries? Is lending done on the right terms? Do the lenders have the right incentives for due diligence? And do the borrowers for prudent lending? as well as ex post incentives: when a problem occurs, are there incentives for a timely resolution, without undue delay? Are there incentives for a fair and efficient resolution, one that enables the indebted country to return to growth quickly, which does not impose undue hardship on its citizens, and provides fair compensation to the creditors?

Some have suggested that simple modifications of the current contractual approach are all that is required. Others claim that some sovereign debt restructuring mechanism would be desirable.

This conference brought together academics and other experts, to discuss these issues and provide guidance on (a) what kinds of contractual reforms would facilitate a better working of sovereign debt markets? (b) What are the limits of the private contractual approach? What are the benefits and limits of a statutory approach? Do contractual approaches help address the problems posed by these limitations? How might these be structured in order to promote a more efficient and equitable market for international debt? Are there intermediate approaches, involving soft law, that might facilitate the functioning of sovereign debt markets?

More generally, the conference sought insights on how the market-based approach can be complemented by a legal framework that replicates the functions of a national bankruptcy court.

  • Patrick Bolton
    Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business
    Columbia University Business School
  • Lee Buchheit
    Honorary Professor
    University of Edinburgh Law School
    University Of Edinburgh
  • Martin Guzman
    Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD)
  • Sean Hagan
    Professor from Practice
    Georgetown Law School
    Georgetown University
  • Jim Haley
    Senior Fellow
  • Barry Herman
    Visiting Senior Fellow, Graduate Program
    International Affairs
    The New School
  • Jurgen Kaiser
    Policy Coordinator
  • Domenico Lombardi
    Global Economy Program
  • José Antonio Ocampo
    Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia University and former Minister of Finance of Colombia
    Columbia University
  • Kunibert Raffer
    Associate Professor
    Department of Economics
    University of Vienna
  • Benu Schneider
    Research Fellow
    Overseas Development Institute
  • Shari Spiegel
    Senior Economic Affairs Officer
  • Joseph Stiglitz
    Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD)
  • Jan Svejnar
    James T. Shotwell Professor of Global Political Economy; Director, Center on Global Economic Governance
    School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
  • Marilou Uy
    Senior Fellow
    Global Economic Governance Initiative
    Boston University
  • Sergio Chodos
    Executive Director for Argentina and Bernardo Lischinsky, Senior Advisor to Executive Director
  • Hugh Bredenkamp
  • Richard Conn
    Managing Partner
    Innovative Partners LLC
  • Timothy B. DeSieno
    Bingham McCutchen LLP
  • Jonathan Eaton
    Brown University
  • Brett House
    Professor of Professional Practice in the Faculty of Business
    Economics Division
    Columbia Business School
  • Robert Howse
    New York University
  • Floyd Norris
    New York Times
  • Jeremiah Pam
  • Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota
    Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations
    Brazilian Mission to the UN
  • Eric Santor
    Bank of Canada
  • Susan Schadler
All Files (17) zip
Jurgen Ppt

5.92mb pptx
Jurgen Kaiser

Joe Newest Ppt

135kb pptx
Joseph Stiglitz

Richard Conn Ppt

56kb pptx
Richard Conn

Eric Santor Presentation

486kb pdf
Eric Santor

Eaton Slides

38kb pdf
Jonathan Eaton

Benu Schneider Ppt

311kb ppt
Benu Schneider

Background Paper Martin Guzman

147kb pdf
Martin Guzman

Sean Hagen Background Paper 1

6.85mb pdf
Sean Hagan

Sean Hagen Background Paper 2

937kb pdf
Sean Hagan

Sean Hagen Background Paper 3

1.32mb pdf
Sean Hagan

Bredenkamp Background Paper

1.07mb pdf
Hugh Bredenkamp

Benu Stiglitz Background Paper

2.20mb pdf
Benu Schneider

Timothy De Sieno Background Paper

189kb pdf
Timothy B De Sieno

Background Paper Stiglitz 1

235kb pdf
Joseph Stiglitz

Background Paper Stiglitz 2

392kb pdf
Joseph Stiglitz

Background Paper Brett House 1

597kb pdf
Brett House

Background Paper Brett House 2

607kb pdf
Brett House