Home > Events > Meetings > Decentralization Task Force Meeting, New York City 2009

Decentralization Task Force Meeting, New York City 2009

June 10, 2009

Columbia University   New York City, New York, United States

Agenda  35kb pdf

The top academics studying decentralization presented and debated the latest research in the field and discussed and evaluated the resulting policy options in the company of World Bank professionals working on decentralization and policymakers from countries with notable decentralization experiments.

Partners

The purpose in both cases was not only for the researchers to share new theoretical and empirical findings with practitioners, but also for practitioners and policymakers to give feedback to the scholars and share their own insights based on their work in the field.Based on the research and discussion at the meeting, we will be working to put out an edited volume of papers that bring together the newest research, policy ideas and critiques of decentralization.

  • Junaid Ahmad
    Task Force Member
    Sector Manager for Social Development in the South Asia region
    World Bank
  • Mani Shankar Aiyar
    Task Force Member
    former Minister of Panchayati Raj
    India
  • Tim Besley
    Task Force Member
    Kuwait Professor of Economics and Political Science
    London School of Economics
  • Shantayanan Devarajan
    Task Force Member
    Chief Economist of the World Bank's Africa Region
    World Bank
  • Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
    Task Force Member
    Professor
    Center for US-Mexico Studies, UCSD
  • Jean-Paul Faguet
    Task Force Chair
    Professor
    London School of Economics
  • Fidel Jaramillo
    Task Force Member
    Economic Advisor
    Inter-American Development Bank
  • Juan Pablo Jimenez
    Task Force Member
    Economic Affairs Officer
    Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC-UN)
  • Adnan Khan
    Task Force Member
    Phd Candidate in Economics
    Queen's University
  • Stuti Khemani
    Task Force Member
    Economist, Development Research Group (Public Services Team)
    World Bank
  • Mai Lu
    Task Force Member
    Secretary General
    China Development Research Foundation
  • Ted Miguel
    Task Force Member
    Associate Professor of Economics
    University of California, Berkeley
  • Dilip Mookherjee
    Task Force Member
    Professor of Economics
    Boston University
  • Roger Myerson
    Task Force Member
    Professor of Economics
    Department of Economics
    University of Chicago
  • Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada
    Task Force Member
    former President of Bolivia
    Bolivia
  • Fabio Sanchez Torres
    Task Force Member
    CEDE Director-Researcher
    Department of Economics
    University of the Andes (Colombia)
  • Joseph Stiglitz
    Task Force Member
    President
    Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD)
  • Federico Weinschelbaum
    Task Force Member
    Associate Professor
    Department of Economics
    Universidad de San Andres
  • Yang Yao
    Task Force Member
    Professor and Deputy Director, China Center for Economic Research
    Beijing University
All Files (28) zip
Administrative Decentralization Law No. 1654 July 28,1995

48kb pdf

Inclusive Growth Through Inclusive Governance

69kb pdf
Mani Shankar Aiyar

Key Role of Panchayati Raj in Building a Resurgent Rural India

83kb pdf
Mani Shankar Aiyar

Political Participation, Clienteles and Targeting Of Local Government Programs: Analysis of Survey Results from Rural West Bengal, India

235kb pdf
Pranab K. Bardhan,
Dilip Mookherjee,
Sandip Mitra,
Abhirup Sarkar

Presentation: Political Participation, Clienteles and Targeting Of Local Government Programs

118kb pdf
Pranab K. Bardhan,
Dilip Mookherjee,
Sandip Mitra,
Abhirup Sarkar

Presentation: Decentralization's Impact on the Accountability andResponsiveness of Public Services: Evidence fromPakistan

131kb pdf
Ali Cheema,
Asim Khwaja,
Adnan Khan

Decentralization and Inequality in Pakistan: Bridging the Gap that Divides?

290kb pdf
Ali Cheema,
Shandana Khan Mohmand

Presentation: Direct Democracy, Decentralization and Governance in IndigenousCommunities in Mexico

252kb pdf
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros,
Beatriz Magaloni

Decentralization and Access to Social Services in Colombia

730kb pdf
Jean-Paul Faguet,
Fabio Sanchez Torres

Crisis, Volatility, Economic Cycles, and Fiscal Policy in Latin America

340kb pdf
Juan Pablo Jimenez,
Jose Maria Fanelli

Presentation: Collective Action in Diverse Sierra Leone Communities

470kb pdf
Rachel Glennerster,
Edward Miguel,
Alex Rothenberg

Presentation: Water Supply Reforms and Child Mortality in Colombia 1990-2004

70kb pdf
Fabio Sanchez Torres,
Claudia Granados

Do the Reforms Contribute to Social Progress? The Case of Water Supply and Sewerage Systems and Child Mortality in Colombia 1990-2004

343kb pdf
Fabio Sanchez Torres,
Claudia Granados

Presentation: Determinants of Subnational Fiscal Outcomes in Latin America: Preliminary Evidence from Colombia and Peru

185kb pdf
Fidel Jaramillo

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Latin America: Regional Disparities and Fiscal Sustainability

474kb pdf
Juan Pablo Jimenez,
Oscar Cetrangolo

Presentation: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Latin America: Regional Disparities and Fiscal Sustainability

935kb pdf
Juan Pablo Jimenez

The Role of Tax Policy in the Context of the Global Crisis: Consequences and Prospects

747kb pdf
Juan Pablo Jimenez

Fiscal Policy and the Commodities Boom:

729kb pdf
Juan Pablo Jimenez,
Varinia Tromben

Gerrymandering Decentralization: Political Selection of Grants-Financed Local Jurisdictions

176kb pdf
Stuti Khemani

Presentation: Gerrymandering Decentralization: Political Selection of Grants-Financed Local Jurisdictions

193kb pdf
Stuti Khemani

Evolvement of China’s Reform and Development

327kb pdf
Mai Lu,
Mingliang Feng

Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan

113kb pdf
Roger Myerson

Leadership, Trust, and Power: Dynamic Moral Hazard in High Office

181kb pdf
Roger Myerson

We consider a model of governors serving a sovereign prince, who wants to deter them from corruption and rebellion. Governors must be penalized when they cause observable crises, but a governor's expected benefits must never go below the rebellion payoff, which itself is better than what any candidate could pay for the office. Governors can trust the prince's promises only up to a given credit bound. In the optimal incentive plan, compensation is deferred until the governor's credit reaches this bound. Each crisis reduces credit by a fixed penalty. When a governor's credit is less than one penalty from the rebellion payoff, the governor must be called to court for a trial in which the probability of dismissal is less than 1. Other governors must monitor the trial because the prince would prefer to dismiss and resell the office. A high credit bound benefits the prince ex ante, but in the long run it generates entrenched governors with large claims on the state. Low credit bounds can cause the prince to apply soft budget constraints, forgiving losses and tolerating corruption for low-credit governors.

Popular Participation Law 1551

83kb pdf

Letter to Mr. Eduardo Aninat on theOccasion of the Forum on SocialEquity

25kb pdf
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada

Fiscal Federalism in Brazil: An Overview

377kb pdf
Jose Serra,
Jose R. Afonso

Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Implications for Decentralized Democratic Governance and Economic Development

203kb pdf
Barry R. Weingast

The Disinterested Government: An Interpretation of China’s Economic Success in the Reform Era

162kb pdf
Yang Yao

Event Information

Type Meeting
Program Decentralization