Debt Restructuring and Sovereign Bankruptcy
Task Force Chairs
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Martin Guzman
Co-President
Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD)
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José Antonio Ocampo
Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia University and former Minister of Finance of Colombia
Columbia University
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Shari Spiegel
Senior Economic Affairs Officer
UN DESA
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Joseph Stiglitz
President
Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD)
Efforts to improve the framework for the resolution of international financial crises have been on the policy agenda for several years, but the recent financial crisis has brought new urgency to the issue. The wave of liberalization among developing countries in the 1970s has now left them especially vulnerable to the volatility of financial markets. Most key players now agree on the importance of a new mechanism to resolve sovereign debt insolvency crises, however there is less agreement on how best to achieve this goal. IPD's Debt Restructuring and Sovereign Bankruptcy Task Force brings together policy makers and the world's leading experts on this topic to develop better instruments and processes to resolve debt crises.
Upcoming Events
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No upcoming events currently
Past Events
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The Future of National Development Banks
09/15/16 - 09/16/17 Meeting
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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IPD-CIGI Host the Third Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring
09/22/15 Meeting
New York, New York, United States
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IPD and UNCTAD Host Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring
03/31/15 Meeting
New York, New York, United States
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Conference on “Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring”
11/17/14 Meeting
New York, New York, United States
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The Resolution of Debt Crises: The Policy and Research Agenda, New York City 2011
02/11/11 Meeting
New York, New York, United States
Latest Publications
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A Rule of Law for Sovereign Debt
12/01/17 Link
Joseph Stiglitz, Martin Guzman
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Identifying and Resolving Inter-Creditor and Debtor-Creditor Equity Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
08/03/16 Policy Brief
Martin Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, Joseph Stiglitz, Skylar Brooks
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International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability
08/03/16 Network Paper
Joseph Stiglitz
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Sovereign Debt: Notes on Theoretical Frameworks and Policy Analyses
08/03/16 Working Paper
Joseph Stiglitz
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Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring that Works
08/03/16 Network Paper
Joseph Stiglitz, Martin Guzman
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The Puerto Rican Crisis is Among the Worst in History
07/11/16 Link
José Antonio Ocampo
Efforts to improve the framework for the resolution of international financial crises have been on the policy agenda for several years, but the recent financial crisis has brought new urgency to the issue. The wave of liberalization among developing countries in the 1970s has now left them especially vulnerable to the volatility of financial markets. Most key players now agree on the importance of a new mechanism to resolve sovereign debt insolvency crises, however there is less agreement on how best to achieve this goal.
Changes in the market and the continued cycle of crises have made clear the importance of going beyond macro analysis, to understand the underlying incentives driving different classes of creditors and debtors in devising a sustainable solution. Much of the literature in the 1980s stressed the creditor coordination problem as the crucial reason for market failures and delays in sovereign debt negotiations. Yet the market has changed considerably in recent years, shifting from lending based primarily on syndicated bank loans to traded securities, and the diverse nature of bondholders has exacerbated creditor coordination problems.