How CACs Became Boilerplate, or the Politcs of Contract Change
Working Paper #54
The authors found this intriguing, as it is doubtful that senior political figures in the major economic powers knew what legal boilerplate was, let alone would advocate for particular clauses. There was policy content in the advocacy, however, over whether ‘market-based’ (i.e. contractual) changes would suffice to provide for orderly restructuring of sovereign bonds of developing countries in financial crisis. In fact, the CACs in question have yet to face a major test under fire. The authors found little indication of belief among the more than 100 intimately involved people in the CAC debate that they interviewed that the clauses would be important determinants of restructuring outcomes.
About the Authors
Mitu Gulati
Professor of Law
Duke University
Anna Gelpern
Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law and International Finance
Georgetown Law
Georgetown University
Publication Information
Type | Working Paper |
Program | Debt Restructuring and Sovereign Bankruptcy |
Posted | 03/01/04 |
Download | 284kb pdf |
# Pages | 41 |