Sovereign Debt

Notes on Debtor Incentives to Repay Debt - Working Paper #14

Shari Spiegel

Paper  94kb pdf

This paper discusses the assertion that debtors always want to repay their debts—because the cost of not doing so is extremely high; when in fact there is little evidence behind this assertion.

About the Author

Shari Spiegel
Senior Economic Affairs Officer

Shari Spiegel joined UN DESA as a Senior Economic Affairs Officer in May 2010. She is co-author and co-editor of several of books and articles on capital and financial markets, debt and macroeconomics. She served as Executive Director of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD). She has extensive experience at the private sector, most recently as a Principal at New Holland Capital and as head of fixed-income emerging markets at Lazard Asset Management. She also served as an advisor to the Hungarian Central Bank in the early 1990s.

Publication Information

Type Working Paper
Program Debt Restructuring and Sovereign Bankruptcy
Posted 03/31/02
Download 94kb pdf
# Pages 5