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The Political Economy of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism

Working Paper #154

Brad Setser

Paper  154kb pdf

The great surprise of the debate over the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) was not that the proposal of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for international legal protection for bankrupt sovereigns failed, it was that the IMF was able to find the political space needed to put forward a proposal that generated a serious public debate on the need for sovereign bankruptcy. This paper delves into the reasons for the SDRM's failure.

About the Author

Brad Setser
Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations

Publication Information

Type Working Paper
Program Debt Restructuring and Sovereign Bankruptcy
Posted 09/11/08
Download 154kb pdf
# Pages 64